Part 3 OONI OF IFE AND ALAAFIN OF OYO SUPREMACY CONTEST— History and Facts Why the Ooni is Superior to the Alaafin

Part 3 OONI OF IFE AND ALAAFIN OF OYO SUPREMACY CONTEST— History and Facts Why the Ooni is Superior to the Alaafin

Nwankwo T. Nwaezeigwe, PhD                                                                                             September 2, 2025

It should be recalled that Lagos was ceded to the British by the Eleko of Eko Oba Dosumu of Lagos and son of Oba Akintoye in August 1861, as A. B. Ellis put it, “in consideration of a pension of £1,000 a year and Lagos thus became a British possession….[i]

In 1863 Oba kosoko then exiled to Lekki and recognized by the British as the paramount ruler equally ceded his dominion to the British Colony of Lagos. Similarly in the same year Badagry was ceded to the same Colony of Lagos while Epe came under British Protection shortly after.[ii] Talking about Alaafin of Oyo’s claim of ceding Yorubaland to the British, could the same claim equally apply to, Lagos, Lekki and, Badagry at least at the present stage of our enquiry?

It is instructive to note that five years after its cession to the British, that was precisely 1866, Lagos Colony was put under the administration of a Governor General at Freetown Sierra Leone. In 1874 following the British-Ashanti War, the Colony of Lagos was again transferred to the Colony of Gold Coast under a Governor General in Accra.

That explained why all the Colonial Governors in Lagos throughout the period of the three attempts to make peace among the warring groups of Ibadan and Ijesha/Ekiti Parapo were Lieutenant Governors or simply Governors under a Governor General at Accra. This situation was however changed after the Berlin Conference of 1884/5 by major European powers, which subsequently inaugurated the scramble and partition of Africa.

In June 1885, the British Government promulgated the Charter establishing the Niger Territory Protectorate under the Royal Niger Company with the administrative Headquarters at Asaba and military Headquarters at Lokoja. Following suit, next year—1886, the Colony of Lagos was severed from Gold Coast and granted autonomy as separate and independent British Colony with Captain Alfred Moloney as its first Governor. This eventually afforded Captain Moloney the legitimate authority to act on his accord on the on-going war between Ibadan and Ijesha/Ekiti Parapo without waiting for the approval of the Governor General at Accra.

This was the situation when Rev. Samuel Johnson visited him on January 23, 1886 to remind him of his earlier effort to bring an end to the civil war among his people. Thereafter, the Governor instructed him to put in writing his views on the prospects of peace returning to the people, which he accordingly did. After approving of his opinion, the Governor then obtained the permission of the authorities of the C.M.S (Anglican Church) in Lagos, to commission him as his messenger to the Ibadan and Oyo his own people, while commissioning Rev. Charles Philips from the opposing warring group of Ijesha/Ekiti Parapo as his messenger to his Ijesha/Ekiti Parapo kinsmen.

The Governor eventually wrote a 17-paragraph long letter dated 27^th February, 1886, to the warring groups detailing his intention to mediate and, further inviting their representatives to meet him in Lagos to discuss the modus operandi. Although seemingly too long to be reproduced here for want of space, it is however logically justified to make it available for deeper understanding of the processes that eventually led to the final cessation of hostilities between the belligerents. The letter reads:

Government House,

                             February 27th, 1886

GOVERNOR MOLONEY TO THE BALOGUNS, CHIEFS, ELDERS AND PEOPLE OF IBADAN,

Gentlemen, —

I have the honour to convey that I take this opportunity to announce to you my return on the 8th ult., and my assumption as Governor of the administration of the Government of the Queen’s Colony of Lagos.

2. It is a pleasure for me to come again amongst people whom I know and who know me, and it is almost needless for me to assure you that, as it has been in the past so it will be in the future, my aim and object to promote in every legitimate way I can, the general interest and development of West Africa and the peace of the country.

3. I attach, as I am informed you do, much importance to the restoration of peace between you and the countries with which you have unfortunate differences.

4. Entertaining as I have always such a feeling and a due appreciation of the value of a general good understanding and friendly relationship in our surroundings, I sincerely invite the entertainment by our neighbours of like sentiment.

5. I am pained to learn that the unfortunate differences which have fruitlessly, as regards the country’s good, struggled on for years between you and the Ijesas, and others still continue.

The country and people are, I gather, tired generally of the miserable and obstructive state of things, which has done so much mischief, and has been productive of no general benefit; on the contrary, there have followed bloodshed, loss of life, devastation, desolation, and other miseries.

6. Good kindly feelings have always existed between you and this colony, may they long continue so; knowing this, I feel it due to inform you of my return.

7. As regards restoration of tranquility once more to the country, and the desire of the contending parties for mediation to be undertaken by this Government, it may be convenient I

should remark that, as a matter of course, distinct and unconditional overtures for peace must be made to this Government by all the parties concerned; then I may feel myself in a position of being enabled to send an officer into the interior with a view to attempt to effect a peace based upon conditions which are likely to render it a lasting one. Each side should but know what conditions as far as he is concerned he has to offer, and would be most likely to prove of duration. On this part I should like to be clearly informed.

8. Then it would be well I should be clearly enlightened by each on the nature of the terms of responsibility, as such must rest entirely with the parties craving peace, for the fulfillment of their engagements, if peace be restored each is prepared to offer and accept.

9. What are the guarantees each will give for his sincerity and earnestness in his appeal for peace.

10. Each side may, for instance, suggest or voluntarily offer that he will enter into an agreement binding on him to suspend hostilities for, say, six months or any other duration deemed advisable, then there should be no need for fresh supplies of guns and ammunitions for such a time. Such an agreement as to cessation of hostilities, and of armament should be entered into not only at the camps but also at all other places concerned within the territories of the opposing parties.

11. Each side may, for all I know to the contrary, be prepared to give as hostages influential persons to any arbitrator, appointed by the Government, against treachery during period of withdrawal of encampment to home, so that neither side may have cause to continue the entertainment of any doubt as to security of retreat. Each side may be ready to engage to withdraw his army at a given time, to subsequently disembody it, and to allow component parts to return to their respective towns, homes, and families, and to the resumption once more of peaceful avocations.

12. From past experience there must be prominent in the minds of contending parties a desire of the Government to befriend them, and to bring about a reconciliation amongst them if they will only place themselves to abide by the settlement the Governor may make.

13. I shall be glad to hear from you soon, and to receive any representative messengers you may be pleased to send to me, who can faithfully give me your mind on your interior troubles, and satisfy me on the sincerity of your desire for the restoration of peace.

14. It should not any longer be viewed or allowed that the present disordered state of things in the interior should be subservient merely as I fear has been the case to the advantage of the few. Peace should be established for the common good of all.

15. The bearer of this letter, the Rev. Samuel Johnson is well known to you all, let me commend him to your kind care and consideration.

16. I have sent a like communication to the other side.

17. Both of my messengers may, with the desire and concurrence of parties concerned, meet on the encamping ground.

Wishing you and your people peace; and to your country an early resumption of peaceful occupation on the part of its inhabitants.

I have the honour, etc.,

Alfred Moloney, Governor.[iii]

Armed with the above letter both Colonial messengers left Lagos to interior Yorubaland in quest for peace. Respectively visiting their various assigned areas which included the Ijebu Ode at their Oru war camp, Ife, Modakeke, Ibadan and Oyo, where the clamor for peace had no opposition, the two messengers with their entourages eventually moved to the main theater of the war—Kiriji Camp for the Ibadan forces and, Oke Mesin for the Ijesha/Ekiti Parapo forces.

However, before arriving at the war camps for the final consummation of their mission, there was a little obstacle from the Alaafin of Oyo with whom they had audience on March 19, 1886. Indeed, the Alaafin did not take the mission seriously, having witnessed the two attempts he supported came to naught. This was in spite of the fact that the Governor sent him an eight-paragraph personal letter intimating him of the mission. Initially, he was not willing to send a messenger to Lagos for the peace treaty as requested by the Governor, he was however compelled to do so after repeated pressure by Reverend James Johnson.[iv]  As Johnson noted:

Having sent twice to Lagos (in 1881 and 1882, Mr. A. F. Foster being sent by the Abeokuta road) on the same subject, one would have expected his active interest and co-operation on this occasion, but it turned out to be otherwise; the failure of the measures initiated by him must have pained His Majesty, and he did not care to compromise his dignity any more by furthering measures doomed to failure. He did not take into consideration the difference in the personality of the new Governor of Lagos. After repeated messages to the palace on the following day, the King at last sent two private gentlemen, and without his staff, as his messengers to Lagos!  Taught by the experience of 1881, the Governor’s messenger declined to proceed with these men except with an Ilari and the King’s staff. Three times he was waited upon the third day, before he at last granted an Ilari, with his staff, and the Ilari was none other but the same Oba-ko-se-tan as before![v]

Having granted their wish, the peace party left the City of Oyo on March 22, and eventually arrived at the Ibadan Kiriji war camp on March 26; where they were received with fanfare. Initially, seeing the Alaafin’s Ilari (royal messenger) among the entourage, the Ibadan war chiefs were reluctant to send messengers to Lagos as they deemed his presence as a sign of bad omen. However, after repeated assurances, they eventually assented to the request. Almost by coincidence, not long after, the Ijesha/Ekiti Parapo peace party led by Rev. Charles Philips arrived at the Oke Mesin war camp where they equally delivered their letters with cordial reception. Without wasting time, both parties not long after accepted the six-month truce proposed by the Governor, eventually hosting the white flag of truce.

But there was the question of the situation at Ikirun war camp where Ibadan forces were battling the Ilorin Fulani forces under the command of Karara in defense of Offa which was besieged by the latter Both Governor’s messengers consequently agreed to travel to Ikirun to request for similar truce. They visited Ikirun where Karara referred them to the Emir of Ilorin. They also visited Offa where the Olofa briefed them on the cause of the war, which was his father’s refusal to join the Ilorin forces against Ibadan their Yoruba kinsmen.[vi] Karara’s position is summed in the following words:

They the Ilorins had been masters of several towns in the Oyo and Ekiti provinces and had their Ajeles (political Residents) in them; but the Ibadans had ousted them from every one of them and would like to oust them from Ofa also! That he would agree to the armistice of six months only on condition that the Ibadans withdrew their contingents from Ofa. He said, moreover, that the Ibadans were remarkable for their treachery ‘but could they equal the Fulanis for wiliness and cunning? The Fulanis have seven different tricks, they have only used one as yet against Ofa and Ibadan, before they have made use of the remaining six Ofa will be taken.’[vii]

 Leaving Offa on April 12, 1886, Rev. Johnson and his party arrived at Kiriji Camp the next day being 13^th April where he reported the result of his mission. While Rev. Philips and his party, having taken a longer route arrived at Oke Mesin Camp on 16^th April, and met Rev. Johnson in Kiriji Camp the next day.  Although Seriki Ogedemgbe was unhappy with the failure of Ilorin mission, being his allies, there was nothing he could do but to abide by the much desired way for peace.

After appointing their respective messengers as requested by the Governor and making further arrangements to ensure the sustenance of the armistice, both parties left for Ife and Modakeke respectively to meet the allied belligerents. While the Ife group led by Rev Philips arrived earlier, the Modakeke group led by Rev Johnson arrived few days later on April 24. Both groups eventually met on April 25 and 26 during which the contents of the peace efforts were presented to them.

For the people of Modakeke, there was no problem accepting the armistice as the Ibadan did at Kiriji, but on the condition that the Ife should stop kidnapping their people in their farms. On their own account, the Ife while accepting the armistice requested to be allowed to rebuild their city; but the Governor’s messengers told them that that would be a decision by the Governor. Furthermore, the people of Ife objected to the hosting of the flag of truce which they considered as being against their custom of being the heirs to Oduduwa who was King at Ile-Ife. In place of white flags, two mounds of witnesses were erected on both sides.[viii]

Having concluded their mission with Ife and Modakeke, both parties with the respective representatives of the warring groups proceeded to Lagos, where they eventually met with Governor Alfred Moloney severally. At the end of the interviews, the Governor drew up a 12-point Peace Treaty adopted by all the parties on June 4, 1886 titled:

TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND COMMERCE BETWEEN THE ALAFIN OF OYO, THE BALOGUN, THE MAYE, THE ABESE, THE AGBAKIN, THE OTUN BAL§ OF IBADAN; THE OWA OF ILESA, THE OWORE OF OTUN, THE AJERO OF IJERO, THE OLOJUDO OF IDO, THE SERIKI OF ILESA, THE OWONI OF IFE, THE OBALUFE, THE OBAJIWO, THE OBALORAN, THE AJARUWA, THE ARODE, THE ARISANRE, THE BALOGUN OF IFE ; THE OGUNSUWA OF MODAKEKE, THE BALOGUN AND OTUN OF MODAKEKC, THE AWUJALE OF IJEBU AND THE BALOGUN OF IJEBU.[ix]

The two contentious points of the Treaty were paragraphs 4 and 5 which read inter alia:

4. The towns of Otan, Iresi, Ada, and Igbajo shall form part of the territories of Ibadan, and be subject to the Bale, Balogun and Chiefs of Ibadan. Such of the inhabitants of the towns aforesaid as desire to leave shall be permitted to do so at such time and in such manner as the Governor, his envoy, or messenger shall direct after conference with the governments of the parties principally concerned, and such people shall not be molested by the signatories their peoples or allies.

5. In order to preserve peace the town of Modakeke shall be reconstructed on the land lying between the Osun and the Oba rivers to the north of its present situation, and such of the people of Modakeke as desire to live under the rule of the Bale and Balogun of Ibadan shall withdraw from the present town to the land mentioned, at such times and in such manner as the Governor his envoy or messenger shall direct after conference with the governments of the parties principally concerned, and such of the people as desire to live with the Ifes shall be permitted to do so but shall not remain in the present town of Modakeke, which shall remain the territory and under the rule of the king and chiefs of Ife, who may deal with the same as they may think expedient.[x]

However, being that all the parties accepted to abide by the Treaty, there was no abstention in the signatories over the above contentions. The representatives having adopted the Treaty by their signatures were further required to take same to their respective kings and chiefs for final signature. Armed with copies of the Treaty, the various representatives left Lagos on June 7, 1886 onward to their various home-bases. With the Treaty duly signed by all the leaders of the respective  belligerent groups beginning with the Alaafin of Oyo, the Governor’s messengers—Reverends Johnson and Philips sent the signed Treaty to him, while awaiting for further instructions from the Governor in the interior— Rev Philips at Ode Ondo and Rev Johnson at Ibadan. Those who signed the Treaty were:

1. Adeyemi, The Alafin of Oyo, June 25th, 1886. 2. Ajayi, Balogun Ibadan, July 1st, 1886. 3. Osuntoki, Maye Ibadan, July 1st, 1886. 4. Fijabi, Abese Ibadan, July 1st, 1886, 5. Fajinmi, Agbakin Ibadan, July 1st, 1886. 6. Tahajo, Otun Bale, Ibadan, June I4th, 1886. 7. Agunloye, Owa Ilesa, July 7th, 1886. 8. Okinbaloye, Owore Otun, July 3rd, 1886. 9. Oyiyosoye, Ajero Ijero, July 3rd, 1886. 10. Odundun, Olojudo Ido, July 3rd, 1886. II. Ogedemgbe, Seriki Ilesa, July 2nd, 1886.  12. Derin, Owoni-elect [Ooni]Ife July 18th, 1886. 13. Awotionde, Obalufe Ife, July 14th, 1886. 14. Oramuyiwa, Obajiwo Ife, July 14th, 1886. 15. Akintola, Obaloran Ife, July 1 6th, 1886. 16. Osundulu, Ajaniwa Ife, July 14th, 1886. 17- JoJo, Arode Ife, July 14th, 1886. 18. Aworinlo, Arisaure Ife, July 14th, 1886. 19. 0ga, Balogun Ife, July 14th, 1886. 20. Ogunwole, Ogunsua Modakcke, July 14th, 1886. 21. Sowo, For Balogun Modakeke, LS July 14th, 1886.  22. Ayanleye, For Otun Modakeke, July 14th, 1886. 23. Aboki, Awujale Ijebu, June 9th, 1886. 24. Nofowokan, Balogun Ijebu, June l0th, 1886 [xi]

Unfortunately, by the time the signed Treaty got to Governor Moloney, he was already due for annual leave and thus decided to delegate the task of the practical implementation of the Treaty to the Acting-Governor Mr. Fred Evans the Colonial Secretary, with whom he appointed as Special Commissioners, the Assistant Colonial Secretary Mr. Henry Higgins and, the Queen’s Advocate Mr. Oliver Smith.

They were assisted by 50 Hausa soldiers fully armed, under the command of the Harbour Master Captain W. Speeding.[xii]  Additionally, Acting-Governor, Evans addressed an 11-paragraph letter to all the signatories to the Treaty intimating them not only of his new assignment but of the emerging British authority over them. The first and second paragraphs read as follows:

Government House, Lagos,

August 14^th, 1886

To Kings, Bales, Baloguns and Chiefs,

I send you greeting.

2. Your good friend. Governor Moloney, has been obliged to go to England for health and rest. But before leaving Lagos he put you all in my hands; he told me how you had all said you were tired of war and wanted peace. He told me how you had all sent your most trusted messengers, to beg him to assist you, and how you had signed treaties promising to be faithful. He told me all he had done for you, and how sorry he was he could not be present when you broke up your armies and camps according to your promises.[xiii]

The peace enforcement expedition left Lagos on August 16, 1886 and visited Ijebu Ode and their war camp at Oru to inform them of their mission, which both the Awujale and his embattled Balogun readily accepted. Leaving Oru war Camp on August 28, 1886 the Expedition moved to Ibadan where, after consultations they had wanted to move to Kiriji war camp but for the advice of Ibadan leaders, who pleaded with them to visit the Alaafin at Oyo. They eventually left Ibadan to Oyo on September 2, 1886 and on the 4^th were given a grand reception by Alaafin Adeyemi. Leaving Oyo on the 6^th of September, 1886, the expedition arrived at Kiriji war camp on September 10, 1886.[xiv]

After exhaustive debates, it was finally resolved that both armies should decamp the same day and the same time after which both war camps would be set on fire at the same time. As a form of security guarantee, it was agreed that both sides should present two prominent chiefs to the Commissioners as hostages to be released only after the implementation of the decisions. It was also resolved to invite Ife and Modakeke leaders to brief them of the new development.

Having interviewed both sides separately, the Commissioners considered it appropriate to bring both commanders together on September 21, 1886 for the first time; and the occasion was no doubt memorable to behold. As Johnson recounted:

The whole of the fighting men of either side were drawn up on the battlefield but they were not allowed to come near except the leading chief of both sides. The fifty Hausa soldiers accompanying the expedition were drawn up in two rows at the two ends of the Commissioners’ camp facing those of both belligerents, and only the leading chiefs were allowed to pass through to the Commissioners’ tents, and there the Balogun of Ibadan, the Maye, Agbakin, Adejumo and others met and shook hands with Ogedemgbe, Lugbosun and other leading chiefs of the Ekiti army. Chief Maye opened conversation, asking after several persons, some still living and some dead, all of them being acquainted with one another. Ogedemgbe was silent, and never uttered a word, probably overcome with emotion: he was finally prevailed upon to speak, but his words were very few.[xv]

Finally, it was resolved that both armies should vacate their respective camps on September 28, 1886. Before then, it was agreed that both belligerents would meet on Thursday September 23, 1886 to take a binding oath of friendship stipulating that none should go to war against the other. This was accordingly performed.

Indeed, that action described as “the proclamation of peace” officially brought the war to an end. So it is right to state that Kiriji War officially ended on September 23, 1886. However, the Ife-Modakeke case remained contentious because of Modakeke’s refusal to vacate their town to their new locations of Ipetumodu, Moro, and Oduabon within ten months as provided in clause 5 of the Treaty and agreed upon at Kiriji camp by Ibadan war chiefs.

Indeed, being that many Ibadan slaves seized the opportunity of the end of the war to escape from their masters; the Chiefs of Ibadan did not wait till the appointed September 28, 1886 to vacate their camps. Most of them left by 25^th and by 26^th the last batch of Ibadan warriors had vacated their Kiriji war camp. The Ekiti Parapo warriors, having noted that Ibadan warriors had vacated their camp equally left on September 26, 1886.

At exactly 12 noon on September 28, 1886, both camps—kiriji and Oke Mesin were set on fire simultaneous on the firing of a gun-shot. Having set the camps on fire, the hostages were released and the peace mission proceeded to Ife and Modakeke.  At Ife, the people insisted that Modakeke must be vacated as contained in clause 5 of the Treaty.

But for Modakeke it was a trauma they were not willing to bear; hence they insisted that the Whiteman should make peace between them and Ife and not to push them away from a land they were already accustomed to, having been refugees from Oyo.  Consequently the armies of both belligerent groups refused to vacate their positions. The Ibadan warriors who were defending Modakeke against the allied forces of Ife and Ijesha/Ekiti Parapo refused to leave Modakeke.

However, it should be noted that all the while the people of Modakeke never claimed ownership of the land, but were all the repeatedly begging for compassion for the Ife to allow them to live beside  them, even if to construct a wall separating them. They alleged that their problem started when Ibadan people drove away the Ife-born Maye of Ibadan—one of the high-ranking Ibadan war chiefs.

From that moment Ife people became hostile to them, leading eventually to one of the Ooni of Ife giving them their present land to settle. They pleaded with the Commissioners to make peace between them and Ife. But the Commissioners responded that they were not there to make peace but to implement the letters of the Treaty.

The position of the Ife was that those Modakeke who were willing to stay should live among them, but that Modakeke must be vacated and destroyed. Meanwhile, the people of Modakeke were accusing their Ibadan protectors of selling them out to the Ife, especially after making peace with the latter.

It came to a point when one of the Ibadan war Chiefs—the spokesman for Modakeke people at the meeting Somonu Apampa, burst out against the Queen’s Advocate Mr. Oliver Smith (Junior Commissioner) who was then presiding over the meeting at the time, in what was considered disrespectful to the Whiteman:

You were sent here to make peace not to destroy lives. When you ordered a population like that of Modakeke to remove at once and go and live in a forest what is to become of the women and children, the aged and infirm, how and where are they to live? How to be sheltered and how [to be] fed? If anything should happen to them, at your hands will God enquire their lives? They and the Ifes had lived in peace between themselves before, and they can do so again if only you would reconcile them together.[xvi]

The Treaty implementation mission thereafter gave Ife and Modakeke October 18, 1886 deadline to amicably settle their differences, otherwise they would take it that the people of Modakeke torpedoed the Treaty. The matter was referred to the Balogun of Ibadan who as would be expected was sympathetic to his fellow Oyo people—the Modakeke and as such took a more diplomatic and mild manner. Seriki Ogedemgbe on his account threatened to attack Ibadan contingents at Ikirun should Modakeke people refuse to vacate. However, at the end he was prevailed upon to avoid renewal of violence.

At the end of October 1886, the Mission finding themselves frustrated by Modakeke’s refusal to abide by Clause 5 of the Treaty, returned to Lagos; but not without extracting promises from both sides against resumption of hostilities. However, it took the commander of the allied forces of Ife/Ijesha/Ekiti, Fabumi from Mesin-Oloja-Oke to take the final initiative to stabilize the situation after the departure of the Whiteman.

Meanwhile, the people of Modakeke had to detain the envoys sent by the Balogun of Ibadan and Alaafin of Oyo one month after the departure of the mission to Lagos until they were assured of peace with the people of Ife. Finally, a compromise was arrived at, leading to the return of the main Ekiti Parapo forces led by Fabumi and Ibadan forces led by Akintola to their respective bases; thus bringing to an end the intractable war between Ibadan and Ekiti Parapo and their Ijesha and Ife allies.

So far, we have been able to establish the fact that up to the moment of the end of this war, that the Alafin of Oyo never exercised any form of suzerainty over any part of Yorubaland except the nominal respect accorded her by Ibadan— the main military power of the time. The question then is how did the same Alaafin who was both a military and political lame-duck throughout the period of the war sign the purported accession of Yorubaland to the British? The answer to this intractable question will come in our next and final part.

To be continued.

Dr. Nwankwo T. Nwaezeigwe is the Odogwu (Traditional Generalissimo) of Ibusa, Delta Sate & President, International Coalition against Christian Genocide in Nigeria (ICAC-GEN). He was formerly Director, Centre for Igbo Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He lives in exile in Manila, Republic of the Philippines.

Email: Nwaezeigwe.Genocideafrica@gmail.com

Visit our: https://icac-gen.org to understand the core reason of my struggles and exile in Republic of the Philippines.

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[i] A. B. Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa, their Religion, Manners, Customs, Laws Languages, Etc London: Chapman and Hall LD, 1894, 18

[ii] R. E. Denneth, Nigerian Studies or The Religion and Political System of the Yoruba London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1910, 8-9

[iii] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 509-11

[iv] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 513

[v] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 514

[vi] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 520

[vii] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 518

[viii] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 524-5

[ix] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 527

[x] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 529

[xi] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 530-1

[xii] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 538

[xiii] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 538-9

[xiv] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 540-2

[xv] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 544-5

[xvi] Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 555